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Imagery in the UK: Britain’s troubled
imagery intelligence architecture
PHILIP H. J. DAVIES*
Abstract. This article examines the status, role and development of imagery intelligence in
the UK government. It is argued that imagery intelligence occupies a subordinate and
marginalised position compared to other forms of intelligence, chiefly from human sources
and the interception of communications. The origins of that position are recounted, and the
problems arising from internal struggles over control of imagery examined. It is concluded
that the existing approach to imagery represents a serious problem and that a substantial
restructuring and upgrading of imagery intelligence is essential if UK foreign policy
decision-making is to be properly informed in the 21st Century.
Introduction
There exists a certain ‘whiggishness’ in how we in the UK perceive the working of
our intelligence community. According to the prevailing orthodoxy, the UK
intelligence system is coordinated with enviable effectiveness and consistency1
through the collaborative and collegial workings of the Joint Intelligence
Committee within the Cabinet Office. The JIC is an executive-level committee that
lies at the hub of a wider national intelligence machinery or Joint Intelligence
Organisation. The rest of the JIO consists in an Assessments Staff that drafts
interdepartmental intelligence analyses for the JIC to approve and circulate; an
assortment of working-level JIC sub-committees called Current Intelligence Groups
that review Assessments Staff papers before they go forward to the JIC; a small
Coordinator’s Group which manages things like the national intelligence budget
(the Single Intelligence Account or SIA) and national Requirements and Priorities
for Secret Intelligence (RPSI) which fund and task the national agencies
respectively; and finally the Intelligence and Security Secretariat which staffs for the
* I am profoundly indebted to students on the Brunel University MA in Intelligence and Security
Studies who assisted in this research and located much of the archival material employed in this
article. Acknowledgement is also due to comments and observations on the original version of this
article made by my colleague at the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies Dr. Kristian
Gustafson. Research for this article was made possible in part by a 2004 Leverhulme Research
Fellowship. All archival references are to the UK National Archives (TNA).
1 A number of US commentators have looked on the British system with something akin to envy
because of the strife-prone history of their own intelligence community. See, for example, the report
of the Aspin-Brown commission Harold Brown, Warren Rudman et al, ‘Preparing for the 21st
Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence’, ‘The Need for Policy Guidance’, downloadable
{http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int007.html}, accessed on 27 November 2007.
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JIO. And at the top of the system the JIC draws it all together, and is made up
of a JIC Chairman and a Coordinator (sometimes with the two consolidated as a
single post), the heads of the national intelligence and security agencies, and
representatives from the policy departments such as the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Home Office and Treasury. And all of this
works to bind the UK’s national intelligence effort into a coherent whole because
of an almost peculiarly British ethos of collegiality and collective common effort.2
For the most part this appears to be a reasonably accurate portrayal of how
the national intelligence machine works. To be sure, certain old canards linger in
the popular imagination such as the mythical rivalry and antipathy between the
Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) which sometimes
crops up in the most unexpected places,3 easily debunked in the light of the
long-standing SIS-MI5 joint operating sections4 and the composition and operation
of units like the Joint Terrorism Assessment Centre (JTAC) and the Joint
Narcotics Assessment Centre (JNAC) which bring representatives from across the
UK government as well as the intelligence community into collaborative, real-
time analysis and warning units.5 Unfortunately there exists a very important
exception to the otherwise apparently seamless of the governance of intelligence in
the British government. That troubled exception is the collection, management and
exploitation of intelligence information from imagery, or imagery intelligence
(IMINT).
Generally speaking, raw intelligence can be said to be drawn from three main
collection methods or in American parlance collection disciplines.6 Human intelli-
gence (HUMINT) is reporting from informants, usually but not always covertly,
ranging from the debriefing of refugees from civil wars through defectors who
abandon country or cause to ‘agents in place’ who can remain inside a target state
or organisation sometimes for decades. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the
interception of (usually) electromagnetic emissions, either in the form of communi-
cations (COMINT) or non-communicative emanations such as radar or radio
telemetry (ELINT). SIGINT is typically the largest bulk producer of intelligence.7
The third main collection discipline is the acquisition of information from
various methods of imaging an object. Imagery intelligence was originally termed
2 For the accepted accounts see, for example, Cabinet Office Central Intelligence Machinery (London:
HMSO, 1993) passim; Michael Herman ‘Assessment Machinery: British and American Models’
Intelligence & National Security, 10:4 (1995), pp. 21–31.
3 Oddly enough, the MI5-MI6 rivalry has appeared most recently in Crispin Black, 7-7: What Went
Wrong? (London: Gobson Square, 2005), pp.41–2, which is surprising given Black’s substantial
intelligence community experience.
4 Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004), pp. 275–78.
5 On JTAC see, for example, Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2003–2004 (London:
TSO, 2003), pp. 27–8. Far less remarked is JNAC which is actually a combined US-UK enterprise,
see for example, House of Commons Daily Hansard Written Answers for 28 November 2006 Column
624W.
6 In recent years, a fourth discipline, Measurements and Signatures Intelligence has often been
included but this is less a single discipline than a catch-all for a range of techniques not covered in
the HUMINT-SIGINT-IMINT triad; see Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘MASINT: the New Kid In Town’,
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 14:2 (2001). A nominal fifth discipline is
the use of open sources (OSINT), but the inclusion of open sources as intelligence as opposed to
being supporting information is far from universally accepted.
7 By some estimates, SIGINT contributes ‘80% of all raw intelligence collected’, see, for example,
W. Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985),
p. 31.
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photographic intelligence (PHOTINT). However, during the Cold War the range
of sensors and portions of the electromagnetic spectrum outside that of visible light
increased steadily is it was found that various frequencies of infrared radiation not
only allowed night vision but also betrayed information about an objects physical
and even chemical composition and radar was able to penetrate even the most
inclement atmospheric conditions.8 As a general rule, imagery can be said to run
a close second to signals intelligence in terms of the total volume of product it is
capable of generating.9
Although imagery intelligence is usually viewed as being most useful to defence
intelligence needs10 it nonetheless plays, and has played, a critical and sometimes
decisive role in wider national security and foreign policy. The potential impact of
overhead reconnaissance and surveillance imagery was arguably most dramatically
indicated by the role it played in revealing the deployment of Soviet medium and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962. That significance has not
diminished. It is imagery that is often a key input to assessing foreign nuclear
programmes by providing information about the state of development of reactors
and nuclear fuel processing facilities. After all, while one might be able to
distribute the production of fuel – or weapons-grade uranium amongst thousands
of centrifuges scattered and concealed across a country (as has been reported of
Iran)11 it requires large, complex, centralised manufacturing facilities to turn the
resulting fissile materials into pits for nuclear warheads or fuel rods for energy
production. Consequently, imagery intelligence is a vital input to national strategy
at a time when key national and international security concerns pivot around
matters like Iran’s or North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. And, of
course, it was stretching judgements based on imagery reporting beyond what the
actual product could reasonably sustain that contributed in a significant part to
governmental and public misperceptions of the threat from Iraq’s non-conventional
weapons programmes prior to the 2003 invasion of that country.12 On such
balance-of-power issues, therefore, imagery intelligence is a core input to decisions
that affect the state and stability of the entire international system. Of course, far
less well known is the role that national imagery intelligence agencies played in
support of international relief efforts such as the 2004 Asian tsunami.13
In the UK, only two of the three principal collection disciplines are represented
at the JIC level: HUMINT and SIGINT. Human intelligence14 is divided along
8 On multispectral sensing see, for example, William E. Burrows, Deep Black: The Startling Truth
Behind America’s Top-Secret Spy Satellites (New York: Berkely Books, 1988), pp. 224–5, 260–3;
G. J. Oxlee, Aerospace Reconnaissance (London: Brassey’s, 1997), pp. 89–104, 130.
9 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power and Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), p. 73.
10 M.Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996),
p. 73.
11 See, for example, D. Albright, P. Brannan and J. Shire, ‘ISIS Report: Can Military Strikes Destroy
Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program? Probably Not.’ (Washington DC: Institute for Science and
International Security, 2008).
12 See, for example, ‘The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMW Commission)’, Report to the President, (Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, 2005), pp. 164–5.
13 Private information. See also National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Media Release 04-14, NGA
Assisting U.S. Agencies in Tsunami Disaster Assessment, 19 December 2004.
14 This is along with closely related activities such as local physical and audiovisual surveillance.
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constitutional lines15 between domestic and overseas activities between the Security
Service operating at home and the Secret Intelligence Service. The Director General
of the Security Service and Chief of SIS or ‘C’ are both core members of the JIC
and have been so since the 1940s. Signals intelligence is represented by Government
Communications Headquarters whose Director sits on the JIC alongside C and the
DG/SS. Imagery, however, has no direct Cabinet Office representation. Instead, it
is but one of several functions represented by the Chief of Defence Intelligence
(CDI) who heads the Defence Intelligence Staff. Consequently, imagery intelligence
sits several echelons below JIC representation. Moreover, DIS’s traditional ‘core
business’, however, is not intelligence collection but all-source analysis. Finally
while the heads of the national intelligence agencies hold Permanent Undersecre-
tary civil service grades,16 in military terms the equivalent of four-star rank, the
CDI is appointed at only 3 star rank or the equivalent of a Deputy Undersecre-
tary.17 Consequently one of the most important intelligence sources occupies both
a subordinate and marginal position within the UK intelligence community.
Ironically, imagery is so marginalised precisely because of its importance.
Retaining control of it has become a matter of importance for DIS which is
otherwise in a comparatively weak position on the JIC as compared with the
national agencies. As a result, the history of imagery intelligence in the UK differs
profoundly from that of the other disciplines. Instead of a narrative of jointery and
collegiality it is a history of turf-wars over its control both between elements of the
defence community as well as between the civilian and defence communities,
inadequate and unsatisfactory attempts to compromise over the balance between
civilian and defence needs and recurrent, even frequent ineffectual bouts adminis-
trative chopping and changing. As Michael Herman has recalled critically of his
own Cold War experience in the UK intelligence community, imagery was one of
a range of single-source assets ‘which DIS steered as national assets, or should have
done.’18 Despite a great deal of tinkering, the management of IMINT did not
improve after the Cold War either. The result is a cautionary tale of conjoined
conflict and neglect that not only puts some measure of a lie to the conventional
wisdom of how intelligence is managed in Britain but also raises serious questions
about the quality of the UK’s intelligence arrangements in an increasingly
unpredictable and challenging 21st century international arena.
The UK imagery intelligence architecture
The UK’s imagery architecture currently consists of three organisations, all
currently under the DIS, two at the strategic level and one tactical. The tactical
element is a former reconnaissance and mapping element of the Royal Engineers
current designated the Joint Aeronautical and Geospatial Organisation (JAGO),
15 In British parlance this refers to the distinction between different aspects of Royal Prerogative,
specifically domestic governance under the authority of the Home Office and foreign relations under
that of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
16 Private information.
17 Herman Intelligence Agencies in an Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2001) p. 84, emphasis
added.
18 Ibid., p. 191.
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based on what was originally called the Geographical Engineering Group (GEG).
This element’s main function is the gathering and collation of geographical
information required for the operations of elements like the Royal Engineers such
as undertaking military earthworks.19 Its work is purely at the battlefield level, and
has a minimum of impact in terms of the national intelligence machinery at the
interdepartmental and Cabinet Office levels. The two strategic level elements are
what is now called the Defence Geographic Centre (DGC) and the Joint Air
Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC), the latter also being officially
designated the National Imagery Exploitation Centre.20
DGC was originally called the Military Survey, the armed services’ (originally
Army) map-making organisation which can trace its history back some two
hundred and fifty years.21 It gives its current mandate as being to ‘[d]eliver
GEOINT [geospatial intelligence], Geospatial information, services and liaison to
Defence, including deployed forces and to OGD [other government departments]
and international partners, underpinning strategic to tactical level decision-making
and action, in order to support the achievement of Defence objectives’. In other
words, it is the contemporary, technology-intensive evolution of the Military
Survey’s original cartographic role during the Napoleonic wars. DGC’s staff has
varied between 1,150 and 1,500 since the Second World War, and at it is currently
based at RAF Feltham.22
JARIC has its roots in interservice photographic intelligence machinery of
the Second World War Allied Central Interpretation Unit. Regularised originally
as the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Centre in 1947, the Centre was renamed
the Joint Air Reconniassance Intelligence Centre in 1953 when its work moved
beyond visible spectrum photography to include ‘exploitation of Radar Scope
photography for intelligence purposes.’23 JARIC was established from the outset
on a joint service basis much as the wartime Central Interpretation Unit had been.
That is to say, imagery analysts, research and development staff and other
operational personnel were provided by the three armed services and a civilian
component made up of Civil Service employees. The Centre’s manpower has
been relatively stable throughout its existence being between 475 and 500, with
a 1996 Ministry of Defence review confirming a normal complement of 500.24
By the end of the 1990s, roughly two thirds of JARIC’s complement of
imagery analysts were drawn from the armed forces, the remainder being
19 See, for example, the JAGO website at: {http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/aboutdefence/whatwedo/
securityandintelligence/dis/icg/jointaeronauticalandgeospatialorganisation.htm} accessed on 21 October
2008.
20 The JARIC website is at: {http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/
SecurityandIntelligence/DIS/ICG/JaricTheNationalImageryExploitationCentre.htm} accessed on 21
October 2008. and DGC at: {http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/
SecurityandIntelligence/DIS/ICG/DefenceGeographicCentre.htm} accessed on 21 October 2008.
21 UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report: The Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence
Agency HC100 (London: TSO, 1999), para. 2.
22 Ministry of Defence, ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and
their Proposed Merger’, appended to House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth
Special Report HC930 (London: HMSO, 2000).
23 ‘Charter for the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (United Kingdom)’ but foliated with
a covering note from J. D. Orme, 17 December 1953, AIR 2/12744.
24 Ministry of Defence, ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and
their Proposed Merger’, appended to House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth
Special Report HC930 (London: HMSO, 2000).
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civilians.25 Although housed and supported by the Royal Air Force, it was
mandated to act as the national centre for imagery intelligence expertise,
successive charters designating it the ‘recognised authority for photographic
intelligence’.26
One of JARIC’s most important functions is exploitation of imagery provided
by the United States from their substantial reconnaissance satellite capability. The
steady increase in the dependency on satellite imagery rather than what are known
as ‘air-breathing platforms’ (such as aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles) since
the 1960s can be indicated by the changed impact of imagery from the UK’s own
overhead reconnaissance from platforms like reconnaissance version of the
Canberra bomber, the PR9. Prior to the emergence and pre-eminence of America’s
satellite systems and their products handled under the cryptonym TALENT-
KEYHOLE (TK) in the second half of the 1970s,27 the PR9 was the main source
of UK strategic overhead imagery. JARIC’s access to TALENT-KEYHOLE
product is secured through a series of agreements with the US imagery organis-
ation, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. The longest standing aspect of
the exchange is the UK permitting the USA to fly U2 reconnaissance aircraft from
sovereign bases such as that in Cyprus.28 However, the UK appears to have
secured a role in the new US overhead surveillance programme, the Future
Imagery Architecture (FIA), by providing a portion of the investment in the new
programme. In exchange for which, it has been reported the UK will be able to
task the new systems in proportion to that investment.29
Despite the national intelligence significance of imagery intelligence, however,
JARIC is not tasked directly under RPSI nor is it funded directly from Single
Intelligence Account under JIC authority as are the national intelligence and
security agencies. Instead, its requirements are within the Ministry of Defence by
the Defence Intelligence Staff through the ‘Collection Coordination and Intelli-
gence Requirements Management’ (CCIRM) process.30 CCIRM is the UK
implementation of NATO’s armed service intelligence tasking procedures31 and is
oriented in the first instance towards the strategic and operational needs of the
armed forces. Consequently, despite the importance of imagery to national
25 Group Captain Stephen Lloyd, Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence,
8 December 1999, question 119; downloadable http at: {http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.
co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/100/9120801.htm} accessed on 21 October 2008.
26 See, for example, the charters issued to JARIC in April 1952, July 1952, and December 1953 in AIR
2/12744.
27 Strictly speaking, TALENT-KEYHOLE is a codeword designating a level and type of access to a
particular intelligence product, in this case overhead reconnaissance; however, individual collection
systems such as CORONA or ARGUS will have Keyhole or ‘KH’ numbers as well as platform-
specific ‘Byeman’ code names and serial numbers; Burrows Deep Black pp. 20–1. In the UK ‘TK
clearance’ is considered a vetting grade above the Developed Vetting standard required for constant
and regular access to top secret codeword materials.
28 Lloyd, ‘Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence’, questions 56 and 57;
although Lloyd’s replies are redacted, the language of the successive questions posed by the
Committee indicate much of what Lloyd confirms about the practice. See also Michael Smith, New
Cloak Old Dagger: How Britain’s Spies Came in From the Cold (London: Gollancz, 1996), p. 199.
29 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1999),
p. 86.
30 UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report: The Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence
Agency Session 1999–2000, HC 100, fn.48, downloaded http from: {http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/cmdfence.htm} accessed on 2 February 2007.
31 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 289–90.
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intelligence it is managed, funded and directed at a purely departmental level. And
much of imagery’s difficulties in the UK can be traced to that basic, unreconciled
tension between national and departmental intelligence needs.
Turf wars in the Cold War
The initial thinking on a post-war system for imagery intelligence was articulated
in a 1945 review of the wartime system conducted by JIC Secretary Denis
Capel-Dunn. The Capel-Dunn report acknowledged that ‘the principal part in
aerial photographic reconnaissance must [. . .] be taken by the Royal Air Force,
since it is they who operate the aircraft.’ On the other hand, it argued that ‘the
interest of the consumers is so considerable that we do not believe any one
Ministry should be burdened with exclusive responsibility for general control and
direction of this branch of intelligence.’ There was even the possibility that
photoreconnaissance might enter ‘the commercial field’ for urban and industrial
planning32 on a basis similar to Royal Ordnance Survey mapmaking. In any event,
because of its broad, multi-departmental relevance, it was essential that PHOTINT
continue to be directed by a JIC Photographic Reconnaissance Committee.33 In
other words, while any new arrangement might be quartered by the Royal Air
Force, its work would be directed at a national level by the JIC and its attendant
machinery.
Once the wartime Allied Central Interpretation Unit was shut down most of
its UK personnel demobilised and released to civilian life. The residual component
was regularised and re-designated the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Centre
(UK) (JAPIC (UK)) in 1947. JAPIC(UK) was placed under exactly the dual-
control arrangement proposed in the Capel-Dunn report. Administration and
quartering for the Centre was given to the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command.
This appears to have been chiefly on the grounds that JAPIC (UK) operated
within mainland Britain which placed it in Coastal Command’s theatre of
operations. Within Coastal Command, JAPIC(UK) was managed on a day to day
basis by an element called the Central Photographic Establishment.34 As a result,
it could be tasked by both CPE for Air Force requirements and the JIC’s Joint
Air Photographic Intelligence Board (JAPIB) for national and interdepartmental
needs. This arrangement lasted barely five years however. In March 1950, CPE
was disbanded and Bomber Command secured control of JAPIC(UK) as part of
an overall consolidation of strategic photoreconnaissance and photographic
interpretation activities nominally on efficiency grounds.35 This made a degree of
sense because Bomber Command was one of JAPIC’s largest consumers in the
RAF because of its production of bombing target intelligence. Moreover, Bomber
Command also controlled the country’s principal overhead reconnaissance
platforms such as the then-newly developed PR9 version of the Canberra
32 Denis Capell-Dunn, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 10 January 1945, p. 10, CAB 163/6, TNA, hereafter
referred to as ‘The Intelligence Machine’.
33 Capell-Dunn, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, pp. 10, 18.
34 Air Chief Marshall H. P. Lloyd to J. S. Orme, Undersecretary of the Air Ministry, 22 May 1952,
AIR 2/12744.
35 H. P. Lloyd to J. S. Orme, 22 May, ibid.
Britain’s troubled imagery intelligence architecture 963
bomber.36 But it also marked the start of a series of tugs of war for control of
imagery intelligence in Britain.
Besides the establishment of JARIC, 1947 also witnessed the first post-war
review of the UK’s intelligence system led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill.
Evill’s review briefly examined the difficult position JARIC in the UK’s intelligence
community. Besides struggling to process and exploit a very large volume of
captured Axis reconnaissance photography, the Centre was also undergoing both
the transition from peace to war and restructuring as a post-war interdepartmental
enterprise. On the one hand, he noted, there was already work in hand to
reconstitute JARIC as an ‘integrated, interservice’ operation under ‘RAF admin-
istration.’ On the other, however, he warned that there was also an urgent need for
better facilities and additional expert technical staff including ‘draughtsmen,
photographic interpreters and model makers.’37 While the administration appeared
to be on course, imagery intelligence was already significantly under-staffed and
under-resourced.
Despite Evill’s confidence about the prospects for JAPIC(UK)’s establishment
on an ‘integrated, interservice’ entity in 1947, by 1950 at least one of its most
important consumers was dissatisfied enough to make the case for a new round of
review and reform. In December that year the War Office formally complained, as
one Air Force official put it ‘to the effect that the JAPIC was not under proper
Joint Intelligence Services [sic] control.’38 In response, an Interservice Working
Party was convened to review the unit’s direction and management. The Working
Party reported in the spring of 1952, by which time JAPIC(UK) and CPE had been
transferred to Bomber Command.
Whatever scale economies might have accrued to the RAF from consolidating
imagery collection and analysis under Bomber Command, the change went no
further towards addressing dissatisfaction with the JARIC’s joint and national
duties. Consequently the Working Party concluded that CPE should be abolished
and all tasking placed on a national basis under JAPIB. The Working Party’s
findings were reviewed and approved by the JIC, at which point Bomber
Command was notified that while it might retain administrative control of
JAPIC(UK), operational control was now a JIC concern. The point was made
somewhat firmly to Bomber Command by the Air Ministry that ‘[i]t has now been
decided that [JAPIC(UK)] shall in future be responsible to the Joint Air
Photographic Intelligence Board [. . .] for the performance and maintenance of its
tasks, and that these tasks and priorities form them shall be laid down by the
Board.’ As if the loss of operational control was not already sufficiently clearly
articulated Bomber Command was placed on notice that ‘[r]equests for the
assistance of [JAPIC] [. . .] should be made to the Air Ministry (ACAS(I) [Assistant
Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence), the Air Ministry member of the JIC] for
coordination by JAPIB with the needs of other users.’39
36 The PR9 would remain in service as a UK imagery platform until 2006, by which time UAVs were
moving into the prevalent air-breathing tactical reconnaissance and mapping role occupied by the
PR9s at the end of their operational livelihood.
37 Douglas Evill, ‘Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947: Report by Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas
Evill’, Misc/P(47)31, 6 November 1947, p.2, CAB 163/7, p. 23.
38 ‘Control of JAPIC(UK)’, 19 May 1952, AIR 2/12744.
39 J. S. Orme to Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, 16 April 1952, ibid. Emphasis added.
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Bomber Command was less than receptive to the new arrangements. They had
had control of IMINT for less than two years, and Commander in Chief Bomber
Command protested the decision on a number of grounds. In the first place, he
argued, CPE had been shut down and JAPIC(UK) moved to Bomber Command
precisely because ‘it was decided that overall efficiency could not be achieved unless
Operational [sic] and Administrative [sic] control were exercised through a common
channel.’ Subordinating JAPIC(UK) to the JIC meant that the control of imagery
collection and analysis would be decoupled, a development he considered ‘funda-
mentally wrong in principle’. It would ‘act as a serious deterrent to progress’ in the
‘common’ photographic collection and interpretation ‘field’ which ‘might well have
disastrous consequences in the event of war.’ Consequently, ‘[u]nless control of
these resources continues to be exercised through this headquarters it will not be
possible to obtain optimum benefit from them.’ He also warned that the emergence
of radar imagery as a new field would be significantly hampered by separating
imagery analysis from collection. Concluding the case by expressing serious doubts
about the practicality of trying to use an interagency committee that met weekly
to ‘exercise day to day functional control of the tasks which it allocates or the
supervision of the policies which it directs’ he pressed for the JIC’s decision on
JAPIC(UK) ‘be reconsidered.’40
In July 1952 Bomber Command got its way. Under a revised charter for
JAPIC(UK), the Centre in principle remained tasked by the Joint Air Photographic
Intelligence Board in principle, but in practice its was to be ‘responsible through
HQ Bomber Command’ to JAPIB.41 Under the new scheme, a senior Air Ministry
official noted to Bomber Command, JAPIB would be ‘the co-ordinating authority
for Naval, Army and Air Force air photographic requirements and will issue
directions to you periodically.’42 Bomber Command and the RAF now became the
gatekeepers on how national requirements would be implemented by JAPIC(UK).
Under the new charter the Air Ministry also secured the right to appoint the
Officer Commanding JAPIC(UK). The only real compromise to joint requirements
and joint interests in what was supposed to be a national centre was a provision
for the War Office to appoint the Deputy Officer Commanding.43 Significantly,
under both the July 1952 and December 1953 Charters for the Centre – the latter
changing JAPIC(UK)’s name to JARIC(UK) and the JIC subcommittee’s name to
the Joint Aerial Reconnaissance Committee or JARIB – the Air Ministry was to
‘be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Intelligence Committee’ for
JARIC(UK) performance and for seeing that requirements laid down at the joint
level were actually carried out by the RAF-controlled Centre.44 In response to such
an ambiguous solution, Bomber Command adopted a persistently obstructive on
administrative matters of detail that was described by one official at the time as ‘a
little bit naughty’ and another as ‘nit picking’.45
40 H. P. Lloyd to J. S. Orme, 22 May 1952, ibid.
41 ‘Charter for the Joint Air Photographic Interpretation Centre (United Kingdom)’ no date, but
foliated with a covering note from J. D. Orme, 30 July 1952, AIR 2/12744. Emphasis added.
42 J. D. Orme to H.P. Lloyd, 20 July 1952, AIR 2/1274.
43 ‘Charter for the Joint Air Photographic Interpretation Centre (United Kingdom)’ no date, but
foliated with a covering note from J. D. Orme, 30 July 1952, AIR 2/12744.
44 Ibid., 17 December 1953, AIR 2/12744.
45 M. H. O’Grady, 25 February 1954; J. M. Freeman, 9 December 1955, AIR 2/12744.
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By 1955 a palpable tension was beginning to develop over the tension between
civilian and service demands for IMINT being articulated through JARIB.
Concerns were raised by members of the Air Ministry Establishments Committee
about the degree to which JARIC was able to meet the full range of demands laid
upon it. After an inspection of JARIC by members of the Committee, it was found
that JARIC generated imagery product for a range of ‘civilian purposes both for
Government departments and for commercial bodies sponsored by civil depart-
ments’ and this raised questions about how it was tasked compared with its
resources. It was noted that the existing practice of JARIB simply inviting bids for
JARIC product created the ‘theoretical risk’ that in such an approach ‘capacity
creates demand rather than being determined by it.’ Despite assurances that the
demand expressed on JARIB would be ‘severely pruned to bring it within available
capacity’ concerns over whether JARIC could be expected to meet civilian
demands ‘beyond what may be possible with an establishment based solely on Joint
Service needs’.46 Indeed, another official noted that, because of the volume civilian
demand in addition to that from the armed services, the requirements articulated
‘at any one weekly meeting’ of JARIB ‘may be far in excess of the whole weekly
capacity of JARIC.’47 There simply was not enough imagery capability to go
around.
The status of imagery intelligence in the UK was further hampered by the fact
that the Joint Intelligence Committee did not appear to know quite what to do
with the discipline. The JIC view of imagery and the work of JARIC were as ‘a
subject which does not really fall within any of the three categories of work of the
JIC defined as collation (assessments), organisation (coordination and manage-
ment) and security’. Seemingly unaware of the levels of demand for imagery
already presenting a challenge to the existing system, the JIC confined itself to the
‘coordination and supervision of demands for photographic and radar reconnais-
sance and photographic intelligence and the allocation of priorities.’48 Conse-
quently, the JIC was far less ‘hands-on’ in supervising imagery than in overseeing
other areas of intelligence activity. All but overlooked by the JIC, therefore,
JARIC did not significantly benefit from the JIC’s 1957 move to the Cabinet
Office. And despite a decade’s development in the field, it did not figure at all in
Sir Burke Trend’s reforms to the JIC system during the 1960s either.49
In early 1957 an attempt was made to try and rationalise JARIC’s tasking
through the creation of a Central Reconnaissance Establishment (CRE).50 The new
mechanism was supposed to create a single, centralised tasking element for all of
the UK’s air reconnaissance assets, including the RAF’s air reconnaissance units as
well as JARIC and its associated training facility, the Joint School of Photographic
Interpretation (JSPI). Far from rationalising IMINT the CRE formula complicated
it. Under the new scheme, Bomber Command retained managerial control. CRE
controlled most but not all operational tasking because a separate element, No.3
46 M. McF. Davis, 3 November 1955, AIR 2/12744.
47 Group Captain J.M Freeman, ‘JARIC(UK) Photographic Section’, 11 November 1955, AIR 2/12744
48 Joint Intelligence Secretariat, ‘History of the Joint Intelligence Organisation’ JIC/1/56, 31 December
1955, CAB 163/8.
49 Imagery is notable chiefly by its absence in the papers detailing the Trend reforms in CAB 163/124.
50 Air Commodore S. C. Widdows, Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) to C in C Bomber
Command ‘Central Reconnaissance Establishment’, 12 February 1956 AIR 29/3310.
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Section, was sequestered specifically for RAF needs and subject to direction from
the Assistance Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence). Even with this restructuring,
CRE still acted as an intermediary for national requirements articulated by the JIC
air reconnaissance subcommittee meaning that the RAF kept control of how and
in what measure national requirements would be addressed by JARIC.51
Coupled to a wider reorganisation of the RAF at the end of the 1960s CRE
was disbanded,52 and JARIC was subordinated to a new line management under
the recently created Defence Intelligence Staff. Under the new scheme, JARIC
continued to be supported administratively by Bomber Command’s successor
Strike Command. But operational control of its actual work and product was
routed through DIS’s Director of Management and Support of Intelligence
(DMSI), one of four principal directors under the DIS’s head, the Director General
of Intelligence (DGI) and his deputy. Increased DIS control led by 1970 to
national tasking under JIC being completely eliminated. The Joint Air Reconnais-
sance Board was reconstituted as a purely Ministry of Defence body under DIS
authority with a much reduced remit. In parallel, a new Joint Targeting Board
took over the production of targeting information for air strike operations and a
Joint Exploitation Board managed broader imagery production and analysis.53 The
central, civilian authority of the Joint Intelligence Committee had been virtually
eliminated. Subsequent reforms to the Defence Intelligence Staff after the Falkland
Islands War in 1982 would serve only to tighten DIS control with the abolition of
the three joint requirements boards in favour of central DIS tasking under
CCIRM.54 Imagery intelligence in the UK would languish in much the same state
until the end of the Cold War.
Institutional flux in a time of strategic flux
JARIC’s status has fluctuated continuously throughout the post-Cold War era.
Like much of the UK defence community, it had felt the impact of the military side
of the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ which culminated in the 1994 Front Line
First Defence Cost Study. Despite the reduction in intelligence funds during that
decade, requirements for intelligence actually multiplied with the deteriorating state
of Soviet strategic and nuclear forces requiring continuous monitoring and a
succession of peace support operational needs in the former Yugoslavia and
elsewhere. With the increasingly forward leaning strategic posture of the Labour
government elected in 1997, the demands on the agency increased still further.
JARIC noted in its annual report that ‘operational imagery tasks’ had increased
between 1997 and 1999 from 450 to approximately 700.55 The Commons Defence
51 ‘Charter for the Central Reconnaissance Establishment and the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelli-
gence Centre’, 16 November 1962 AIR 2/12744.
52 ‘Proposed Reconnaissance Staff Establishment for the Control of UK Reconnaissance Forces on the
Disbandment of CRE’, CRE/S553/4/Org, no date, but foliated with covering note from K. C.
Giddings, CRE, to OC JARIC Group Captain J. S. Hart, 25 January 1968, AIR 14/4103.
53 ‘The Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (United Kingdom) JARIC(UK)’ DS16/JSE/6 July
1970; Group Captain J. S. Hart OC JARIC ‘JARIC(UK) – Revised Organisation’ JAR/S1/Air, 4
November 1969, AIR 14/4103.
54 Private information.
55 Quoted in UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report para. 13.
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Committee further observed of this jump in requirements that ‘[t]he additional
workload of the Kosovo campaign meant that for a brief time JARIC could not
meet one of its non-operational ‘“priority three” targets’56 although it was likely to
make up the shortfall later in the year. One immediate consequence was a
strengthening of JARIC’s position in defence expenditure under the a new Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) which commenced in 1997 and aspects of which were still
under way when the terrorist attacks on the United States occurred in 2001.
In May 1999, the government announced its intention to merge JARIC with the
Military Survey Agency. The amalgamation, effective on 1 April 2000, combined
the two into what was originally designated the Defence Geographic and Imagery
Intelligence Agency or DGIA. To some degree the move was seen as intended to
bring the UK’s imagery intelligence architecture more closely into line with
America’s recently established national imagery agency, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (later renamed the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency).57
However, the decisive motives were the expected scale economies of administration
and technology that it was thought the merger would bring about. The move had
originally been suggested during the 1994 Defence Cost Review under the previous
Conservative administration of John Major. It received further support four years
later in a report produced as part of Labour’s SDR. According to a Ministry of
Defence minute provided to the Parliamentary Defence Committee, the 1998
review concluded that ‘a number of business areas across [JARIC and Military
Survey], if brought together, would provide operational benefit, in terms of
effectiveness gains and improved customer service, and possible efficiency savings’.
Admitting that ‘a large proportion of the current core processes were assessed to
be too different to justify merger on that basis alone’, there was a compelling case
for ‘convergence’ that would ‘allow a common tasking and production manage-
ments function to better control all available resources, giving improved surge
capability in crises and improved responsiveness in tasking [. . .] facilitate interop-
erability of softcopy products and information [and] allow rationalisation of
Agency overhead functions.’58
Although the creation of DGIA was welcomed by parliamentarians on the
Defence Committee, their counterparts on the Intelligence and Security Committee
were less enthusiastic. JARIC was, they argued ‘a national resource and could be
better tasked from the national level’ as a consequence of which ‘the JIC National
Intelligence Requirements paper would act as the prioritizing document and [. . .]
JARIC would then serve the national requirement and have its performance
assessed by the JIC.’ The ISC were convinced not only that this would not compete
with or degrade JARIC’s fulfilment of the DIS requirements process but moreover
that such a change ‘opens the way for JARIC to be funded in part from outside
the MOD budget’59 – in other words at least in part under the JIC-managed
national intelligence budget or Single Intelligence Account. The CDI and DIS
were, however, firmly unwilling to lose control of JARIC as a service enterprise60
56 UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report para. 13.
57 ICHR. Lloyd Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, q.2.
58 Ministry of Defence, ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and
their Proposed Merger’.
59 ISC Annual Report 1999–2000 paras. 24–25.
60 Private information.
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and the government flatly rejected the proposal on the grounds that CCIRM
already took place under the overall terms of national priorities and therefore ‘the
JIC’s requirements already guide JARIC’s work.’61 The prospect of funding
JARIC independently under SIV, the thin end of a wedge that could eventually
imply autonomous status for JARIC as a national agency, was not even addressed.
On 1 June 2006, the collection side of DIS under went a re-organisation (the
second in barely twelve months).62 Amongst other changes, Defence Geospatial
Intelligence was abolished, and the Military Survey and JARIC became separate
entities once again. While JARIC retained its original identity, what had been the
Military Survey Agency became the Defence Geographic Centre. The entire
experiment of a consolidated imagery intelligence agency had been abandoned after
barely half a decade’s effort and expense.
Conclusion: UK imagery intelligence for the 21st century
There can be very little doubt, therefore, that if imagery intelligence in the UK is
going to thrive and contribute to the level that it should theoretically be able to
it cannot continue as it has. It has not, of course, been a complete failure in the
narrative of joint intelligence governance and management in Britain. It has been
staffed and operated collaboratively by the three armed services and the Civil
Service for 62 years. It is highly regarded for its competence in the ‘four eyes’
intelligence alliance of Britain, the USA, Canada and Australia, punching well
above its numerical and budgetary weight. Moreover, JARIC’s small size and
comparatively small budget belies the associated investment that has gone into
successive generations of strategic reconnaissance and surveillance systems, includ-
ing the no doubt substantial expenditure of the UK’s contribution to the US
Future Imagery Architecture.
Nonetheless the conclusion has to be drawn that, for imagery intelligence to
both reach its potential and provide the contribution to UK national security, it
should it must be placed on a footing comparable to the other collection disciplines
of human and signals intelligence with its own voice on the Joint Intelligence
Committee, funded from the Single Intelligence Account and tasked in the first
instance under RPSI. Whether such resulting national imagery architecture would
take the form of a free-standing JARIC on its own or a reconstituted Defence
Geospatial Intelligence Agency established at a national level, and to which
Secretary of State such an arrangement would be answerable, are matters that
require closer deliberation than is possible here. But whatever formula might be
adopted, imagery intelligence in the UK cannot and should not be allowed to
continue to languish in the future as it has in the past. Imagery intelligence in the
British government must have a status and resource base proportional to its real
value and impact on foreign policy and, thereby, wider international affairs.
61 Cabinet Office, ‘Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Annual Report
1999–2000’, CM 5013.
62 The previous such restructuring had been in December 2005; Defence Intelligence Staff, The Defence
Intelligence Staff downloaded pdf from {www.mod.gov.uk} accessed on 10 January 2006, p.8;
Ministry of Defence, ‘About Defence: Defence Intelligence’, downloaded http: {http://www.mod.uk/
NR/exeres/DEA75B45-FFCF-411C-8F86-E0EEAF023BB7.htm} accessed on 4 May 2007.
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